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The accurate and efficient modeling of Internet worms
is a particularly challenging task for network simulation
tools. The atypical and aggressive behavior of these worms
can easily consume excessive resources, both processing
time and storage, within a typical simulator. In particular,
the selection of random IP addresses, and the sending of
packets to the selected hosts, even if they are non–existent
or not modeled in the simulation scenario, is challenging
for existing network simulation tools. Further, the computa-
tion of routing information for these randomly chosen tar-
get addresses defeats most caching or on–demand routing
methods, resulting in substantial overhead in the simula-
tor. We discuss the design of our Internet worm models in
the Georgia Tech Network Simulator, and show how we ad-
dressed these issues. We present some results from our Inter-
net worm simulations that show the rate of infection spread
for a typical worm under a variety of conditions.
1. Introduction
The Internet has recently been the target of widespread
denial–of–service attacks in the form of Internet worms. A
typical worm will exploit some vulnerability in a host op-
erating system, usually an implementation bug or design
flaw, to cause the execution of a set of unauthorized soft-
ware codes on the victim systems. This malicious software,
or MalWare, can then inflict any manner of disruptive ac-
tions on the victim, ranging from nothing at all, to complete
destruction of all programs and data on the victim.
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Further, the worm will attempt to replicate itself on other
end–hosts with similar vulnerabilities. It does this by send-
ing so–called Infection Packets to randomly chosen victims.
When an infection packet reaches a target system with the
same vulnerability, that system also becomes infected and
in turn attempts to infect even more victims. It is easy to
see that the total number of infected hosts over time (called
the Infection Rate) can exhibit exponential growth in cer-
tain conditions. Indeed, it is estimated that the recent Slam-
mer worm reached 90% of susceptible hosts in just a few
minutes[10]. It is important to note that, for the class of In-
ternet worms of interest here, no human intervention at all
is needed for the worm to spread. In contrast, methods that
use e–mail attachments or other file sharing methods, and
require a user actions to execute the MalWare can poten-
tially be thwarted simply by increased user awareness.
Given the potential for widespread disruption of the In-
ternet, the need for detailed modeling and analysis of the
behavior of these worms is obvious. Understanding how
to detect when a worm attack is underway would lead to
the development of filters or screening methods that could
lessen the effect of future worms. Detecting and reacting
to attempted infections, perhaps with active countermea-
sures, could slow down the infection rate sufficiently that
human intervention could effectively limit the damage. De-
tailed studies of the so–called White Worms could lead
to the development and deployment of active countermea-
sures that would eliminate or block the vulnerabilities be-
fore widespread infections occur.
We have developed worm models for the Georgia Tech
Network Simulator (GTNetS) [12] that can be used to study
the behavior of these Internet worms under a variety of
conditions. We have included models for both the UDP
and TCP style infection methods, since there have been in-
stances of both methods in recent worms [16]. Our simula-
tion models include complete packet–level detail, both for
the worms and competing traffic on the modeled subnet-
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works. By using this level of detail, we capture behavior
such as queue buildup and subsequent increase in round–
trip time due to the worm traffic itself, as well as the af-
fect of competing traffic on the infection packets. This level
of detail is necessary to capture a complete picture of the
worm’s behavior in the presence of other data flows and de-
fensive mechanisms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides some information on worm modeling ef-
forts by others, both in packet–level simulations and with
analytical models. Section 3 describes in detail our worm
models and section 4 discuses the modifications needed in
the GTNetS simulator to efficiently model the worms on
a large scale. Section 5 presents some preliminary results
from our simulation–based experiments of worm spreading.
Section 6 gives some concluding remarks and future direc-
tions for this research.
2. Related Work
In this section, we discuss some existing simulation
tools that have been used to model the behavior of Inter-
net worms. These existing tools can be loosely separated
into two categories, the analytical models and the packet–
level models.
A good analytical model of the infection rate of Internet
worms can be obtained by basing the analysis on epidemi-
ological models of disease spread[5]. Several of the charac-
teristics of the Internet worms have direct correspondence
to disease models, such as the infection probability, infec-
tion population, hosts interactions, and others. Indeed, us-
ing such an approach was discussed as early as 1991 [7].
Zou, Gong, and Towsley [17, 18] used this approach to ob-
tain predict the spread of worms under a variety of condi-
tions, and to measure the effectiveness of a proposed detec-
tion and defense mechanism.
Gao et. al [1] discuss another analytical approach called
the Analytical Active Worm Propagation (AAWP) model.
This model improves upon the epidemiological models in
a number of ways, including accounting for systems crash-
ing, systems being repaired and patched, and delay times
for infected hosts to actually begin spreading to others. Fur-
ther, Gao’s approach uses a discrete time model as opposed
to the continuous time models in the earlier approach.
The primary benefit of the analytical models is compu-
tational efficiency, in that the numerical solutions to these
models are largely independent of population size (topology
size), and can easily predict worm behavior on networks of
millions of elements. However, such models typically fail
to take into account the affect of queuing delay, packet loss,
and round–trip time delays in their predictions, nor can they
measure the affect of the worm traffic on other legitimate
traffic.
Packet–level detail models on the other hand, can be con-
structed to model in detail the effect of network character-
istics, such as queue length, queuing discipline, link band-
width, routing protocols, and the like. A significant work
in this area is by Liljenstam et. al [8]. In this work, the
SSFNet [4, 3] simulator was extended to include models
of the behavior of Internet worms, and used to measure the
worm’s affect on the network dynamics. Their approach was
a hybrid method, using complete packet level details for part
of the network, and a less accurate but more computation-
ally efficient model for other parts. They report good suc-
cess with this approach in predicting the overall spread of a
typical worm, and the affect of this spread on the network
as a whole.
In [15], Wagner discusses a detailed simulator for worm
propagation implemented in the Perl scripting language. In
this work, the affect of link bandwidth and propagation de-
lays are taken into account, but queuing, loss, and compet-
ing traffic are ignored. Further, the TCP–based worm mod-
els use a simplified behavior model for TCP, lacking slow
start and congestion window management features.
The venerable ns2 [9] simulator has recently been ex-
tended to include some models for worm behavior. The
approached used in ns2 is similar to that use by SSFNet,
namely the hybrid approach with detailed packet–level sim-
ulations for only a small part of the network. Further, ns2
has no built–in mechanisms for assigning IP addresses to
nodes, and thus the address scanning models for worms be-
come problematic.
To our knowledge, our approach is the only one to date
that allows full packet–level detail simulations of worm in-
fections for moderately large networks, including details of
TCP connection establishment and slow start, correct for-
warding of packets addressed to non–existent end–hosts,
and the effect of competing legitimate traffic on the spread
of the worm.
3. The GTNetS Worm Models
In this section, we discuss in detail the design of our
worm models for GTNetS. To provide background for un-
derstanding our model design, give a brief overview about a
worm’s life cycle from its activation to its spreading to other
hosts. Even though attempts of classifying worms have been
made [16], it is still hard to find a way to make a com-
pletely generalized model that fits all of the classes. In this
work, we are only concerned with the Traditional Worms,
that do not require human intervention to spread. They in-
fect other systems by exploiting vulnerabilities in the soft-
ware. From a network point of view, these vulnerabilities
are mostly due to flaws in Application-Level functionality
that is typically built on either TCP or UDP transport level
protocols. The most common flaw in the application level
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software is the Buffer Overflow bug [2], which can erro-
neously allow the system to execute code contained in spe-
cially built network packets. This code either contains the
complete program of the worm, or a portion of it that opens
a side channel to download in the rest of the code from
the infecting host. This phase can be called the Propaga-
tion Phase of the worm. Subsequently, the worm code exe-
cutes instructions on the host in order to gain privileged or
root–level access to the compromised system. In this Acti-
vation Phase, the worm code can deploy any kind of pay-
load or proceed with the task of infecting other hosts. In
this Infection Phase the worm instance selects target hosts
by generating IP addresses of possible victims. The use of
the 32–bit IPv4 address space lets worm writers use sev-
eral target selection strategies (also called the worm’s Tar-
get Vector), such as hit–list scanning, uniform random scan-
ning, local preference scanning etc. These scanning tech-
niques are also an important factor affecting a worm’s in-
fection rate.
While designing our worm model and worm simulation
environment, we aimed at fulfilling several objectives. The
first objective is that the worm model should have mini-
mal overhead in the network simulation environment. Sim-
ple and efficient worm models will enable large–scale sim-
ulation of worms by keeping memory and CPU overhead
to a minimum. Our target is to achieve million node simu-
lations of worm propagation. While the GTNetS simulator
has demonstrated the capability of multi–million node sim-
ulations [6], these demonstrations used idealized scenarios,
and thus are not directly applicable to worm simulations.
However, we have achieved more than 50,000 nodes in a
worm simulation, and have not yet exploited the distributed
simulation features of GTNetS, and thus are confident of
meeting our longer–term goals.
The second objective is that the model should capture
the important parameters that affect propagation and infec-
tion rate with packet level details. A third objective is that
it should be flexible enough for supporting a wide range of
worm activities and classes.
The worm models in GTNetS are designed around the be-
havior of the real worm code and underlying network pro-
tocols. Therefore the model allows parameters to be set that
represent the worm action in its different phases. For the
complete worm simulation, several other parameters includ-
ing the network topology, host vulnerability probability, and
the IP Address distribution must be specified using inherent
GTNetS features. The parameters describing the worms are:
• Transport Protocol - The underlying transport proto-
col creates a distinct difference in propagation from a
network’s point of view. UDP based worms such as
the Slammer [10] have small infection packets that are
generally transmitted as fast as possible, limited only
by the bandwidth of the outgoing link. These pack-
ets might get dropped, but the worm itself does not
wait for any acknowledgments from the target. The
propagation speed and therefore the overall scan rate
of such a worm depends on the available bandwidth
of the network. On the other hand, worms exploit-
ing TCP require a connection to be established be-
fore the payload packets are sent, and therefore the
propagation speed depends on the average round trip
time (RTT) between hosts. These classes of worms are
called RTT-limited. Such worms improve propagation
speed by using several simultaneous TCP connections,
typically by writing the worm as a multi-threaded ap-
plication. Our model supports both of these types of
worm classes. We should also add that the model is
flexible enough to be extended to incorporate propaga-
tion methods that use both methods.
• Infection Length - This parameter specifies the size of
exploitation data that is sent to a victim host to infect
it. For example, smaller worms might need just a sin-
gle UDP datagram or TCP segment, and presumably
little or no IP fragmentation. For TCP based worms
more TCP segments might mean longer delay due to
several round trip times being required to transfer the
worm payload. Large infection payloads can also cause
more aggregate data being transferred through the net-
work, leading to higher probability of saturating the
links quickly or dropped packets due to queue over-
flows.
• Infection Port - The transport layer port that is used
to send infection packets to can be specified. When a
worm instance starts sending infection packets to other
hosts, it is addressed to this specified port on the tar-
get host. This feature allows simulations with compet-
ing background traffic to hosts on other ports, or the
same port.
• Target Vector and Scanning Pattern - The worm model
in GTNetS allows flexible selection of scanning pat-
terns. This is implemented as an extensible class that
generates IPv4 addresses for a particular worm in-
stance on a host. This behavior of this class has sev-
eral variations, as follows:
– Uniformly Random Scanning - Any IP address
is generated in a specified address range with the
same probability.
– Local Preference Scanning - A victim IP on the
same subnetwork as the presently infected host is
chosen with higher probability than other IP ad-
dresses.
– Sequential Scanning - IP addresses are chosen
sequentially within a specified range.
Since our implementation is an object–oriented ap-
proach, the target vector generation class can easily be
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overridden by the simulation user to create any scan-
ning method desired.
• Scanrate - This is for UDP based worms only, since
the rate at which infection packets are generated by
TCP worms is a function of the number of simulta-
neous TCP connections and other external factors. For
UDP based worms, the worm transmits infection pack-
ets at the rate specified by this parameter.
• Connections - This parameter is used to model the
number of simultaneous connections that are used by
TCP based worms. The Code Red II worm [11] used
300 threads to connect to different target hosts at the
same time, allowing a maximum of 300 sustainable
TCP connections. Our model allows worms like this
to be represented in the simulation.
Another important factor in studying worm propagation
is the network topology used to carry worm and background
traffic. GTNetS offers the flexibility of setting up any arbi-
trary topology, by connecting together any of the many pre–
defined topology objects. In the next section, we describe
our additions to GTNetS that allow creation of reasonable
topology models, in a scalable and efficient manner. Fur-
ther, we describe methods to alleviate potentially excessive
overhead in the simulator due to the random target selec-
tion methods used by worms.
4. Enhancements to GTNetS
The worm behavior itself leads to several potential inef-
ficiencies in a simulation environment, which must be ad-
dressed to achieve scalable and efficient simulations. We
discuss these issues and our solutions in the GTNetS sim-
ulation environment.
From an efficiency standpoint, a primary concern in net-
work simulation environments is the computation and stor-
age of packet routing information. A common approach is
the a priori computation of routing tables for every node
in this simulated topology. This method is easy to under-
stand, easy to implement, and is a reasonable approxima-
tion of correct packet routing in the network. However, as
the size of the simulated topology increases, the CPU and
memory demand on the simulator become unmanageable.
GTNetS solves this problem by using the well–known NIx–
Vector [13, 14] routing method. With this method, routes
are computed only as needed, and are stored in the pack-
ets, rather than in routing tables. The route computation
uses a breadth first search (BFS) algorithm on the topology
graph to find the shortest path from a source to a destina-
tion. The NIx–Vector is an efficient method for storing rout-
ing information in packets, and can represent most routes
in 32 bits or less. To avoid excessive CPU time for comput-
ing the routes, the NIx–Vectors are cached at the source node
and re–used as needed. The NIx–Vector routing method has
been shown to be a reasonably efficient method for packet
routing in simulated networks [13].
However, the generation of infection packets to ran-
domly generated targets circumvents many of the benefits of
NIx–Vector routing. The BFS algorithm is executed repeat-
edly, with little likelihood of a cache hit on a previously cal-
culated route. Further, finding routes to non–existent hosts
causes the BFS algorithm to exhaustively search all paths
before determining that no route exists. Finally, worm pack-
ets must be routed in a reasonable way, even if the target
does not exist (implying that no NIx–Vector can be found).
We address these issues in our GTNetS worm models by
several enhancements in the route computations, described
below.
4.1. Routing Proxies
The notion of Routing Proxy was introduced in GTNetS
to reduce the cost of searching for routes to nodes (either
existing or non-existent), and to enable realistic forwarding
of packets that are destined to non-existant hosts. A Rout-
ing Proxy can be expressed by a pair (A, S) where A is the
base address of the range and S is the network size. For
example (102.10.0.0, /16) represents a /16 network start-
ing at the address 102.10.0.0. Any output link interface I
at a node N in the network topology may be assigned one
or more Routing Proxies denoted as Pi having the follow-
ing properties:
• The IP addresses of any node M that is reachable via
N through interface I must be contained in any of the
address ranges Pi.
• The IP addresses of any node M that cannot be
reached via N through interface I must not be con-
tained in any of the address ranges Pi.
The above insures that when defined, the Routing Prox-
ies should reveal all possible addresses reachable by that
node through that interface. It should be noted though, that
for nodes that are normally in the backbone or have a large
list of reachable address ranges, the Routing Proxy would
likely be omitted, since in all likelihood there would be
many sets of IP address ranges reachable through that node.
In our experiments, we defined the proxies only at the gate-
way nodes to sub–networks.
When the route computation algorithm encounters a
node with a Routing Proxy defined that encompasses the tar-
get IP address, the algorithm halts and returns a NIx–Vector
to the node containing the routing proxy. When the corre-
sponding packet later arrives at the node with the routing
proxy, the appropriate output interface can easily be de-
termined by searching the proxy information. Thus, even
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packets addressed to non–existent nodes will be prop-
erly routed to the ingress gateway on the proper sub-
network, just as similar packets would be in the Inter-
net.
4.2. BFS Pruning
As mentioned earlier, the BFS route computation algo-
rithm can be a source of significant CPU overhead in the
simulator. Our Routing Proxies feature described above al-
lows for an improvement in the standard BFS algorithm that
substantially reduces the CPU overhead for route computa-
tions. Our modified BFS algorithm incorporates the infor-
mation found in the Routing Proxies to reduce the search-
ing cost.
We start by further restricting the definition and meaning
of a Routing Proxy as follows:
• With Routing Proxy entries for node N and interface
I defined, only those nodes with IP addresses encom-
passed by any one of those Routing Proxy entries is
reachable via that interface.
The importance of the third restriction is such that the
BFS algorithm can prune large portions of the topology
graph when computing a shortest path route. Since the
proxy specifies that only the specified range is reachable
via a specific interface, all neighbors of that interface can
be pruned if the destination address is not in the specified
range.










The use of the Routing Proxies leads to another improve-
ment in the computation and storage of routes, namely the
use of NIx–Vector aggregation. Recall that the NIx–Vector
calculation will stop when a node is found that has a Routing
Proxy defined encompassing the target IP address. The cal-
culated NIx–Vector is used to route the packet to the proxy
node, which in turn routes the packet to the final destina-
tion. However, in this case the calculated NIx–Vector is valid
not only for the original target IP address, but for all IP ad-
dresses in the proxy range. In other words, if a NIx–Vector
to a /16 proxy address is calculated, that same NIx–Vector
is correct for 216 targets encompassed by that proxy. Thus,
when future packets are addressed to any target in the same
/16 range, the same NIx–Vector should be used.
The NIx–Vector aggregation feature stores the cached
NIx–Vectors at each source node along with a specification
of the IP address range for which this NIx–Vector is valid.
Subsequent cache lookups for a target IP address in that
range return the same NIx–Vector. This adds a small extra
cost in NIx–Vector cache lookups, but reduces the overall
number of route computations needed in the worm simula-
tion.1
4.4. Random Tree
Another important issue when studying the infection
rate of Internet worms is a reasonable topology graph, par-
ticularly one that has some mix of IP addresses that are
valid and modeled, as well as addresses that represent non–
existent hosts. In other words, for a given subnetwork with
a /16 address range assigned (for example), it is rarely the
case that all 216 IP addresses in that range actually are as-
signed to a working host. It is likely the case however, that
all packets addressed to any address in that range from else-
where in the network will be delivered to the subnetwork (at
a minimum to the ingress gateway), and then later dropped
at some point within the subnetwork. The correct and effi-
cient modeling of these holes in the IP address space is an
important criterion for simulation–based worm studies.
In GTNetS, we introduced a topology model object for
a Random Tree. A random tree is defined by it’s depth and
fanout values, as are normal tree objects, but extended to in-
clude a child probability factor. As the tree topology is be-
ing constructed, child nodes are randomly pruned based on
the child probability factor. The result is a topology object
with a sparse IP address space, with some fraction of the
possible IP addresses unassigned. To illustrate this point,
we give an example.
Let f be the fanout, d be the depth, q be the address uti-
lization ratio and p be the probability of generating a child.
In the random tree, any non–leaf node will have an expected
number of fp children. So, the expected number of leaf
nodes of the entire tree is (fp)d−1.
Therefore, for a given tree with f and d, we can calculate








1 Presently, the implementation of NIx–Vector aggregation in GTNetS is
work–in–progress and is not complete.
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Figure 2. Effect of Parallel Connections
So equation 1 shows that the value of p does not depend
on the fanout of the tree. If it is required to generate a ran-
dom tree having 25% of the addresses used and a depth of
5, we set q = 0.25 and d = 5 in equation 1 and get the re-
sultant value of p = 0.707.
5. Experimental Results
In this section, we give some preliminary results for
worm infection rates for both UDP and TCP worms. These
results are intended to illustrate the capabilities of our GT-
NetS worm models, and not intended to show a comprehen-
sive study of worm infection rates.
The results in figure 1 show the effect of the TCP pay-
load size on on the infection rate. As expected, worms with
larger payloads will spread less quickly, due to more round
trip times elapsed during the payload forwarding. Results in
figure 2 show the effect of the number of simultaneous TCP
connections on the overall worm propagation. Again, as ex-













































Figure 4. Effect of Scanrate for UDP worms
The results in figure 3 demonstrate the effect of link
bandwidth on UDP worm infection rates. UDP worms are
typically limited by the first–hop link bandwidth, and the re-
sults show this is the case. Slower links results in slower in-
fection rates. Figure 4 shows that UDP worms that send in-
fection packets at a higher rate (within the constraint of the
first–hop link bandwidth) will spread faster than those with
slower scan rates. Finally, figure 5 shows that UDP worms
with larger payloads will propagate more slowly than those
with small payloads, although this is not as pronounced as
the TCP worms with larger payloads. This is due to the fact
that UDP worms do not wait of acknowledgments and thus
are largely independent of round trip times.
6. Summary
We have introduced our worm models for the Georgia
Tech Network Simulator, and discussed a number of effi-
ciency issues that must be addressed in any simulation en-
vironment designed to perform packet–level simulations of
Internet worms. A number of novel features for our simula-
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Figure 5. Effect of Payload size for UDP
tor have been designed and developed, and have lead to the
capability to perform simulation studies of Internet worms
in realistic environments.
We have not yet exploited the parallel and distributed
simulation features of GTNetS for this research, but will do
so in the near future. Our current success in modeling mod-
erately large topologies with the sequential version of GT-
NetS, coupled with earlier success modeling extremely large
topologies with GTNetS, leads us to be optimistic about fu-
ture Internet scale worm models and simulation studies.
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